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Abstract. Why is gauge symmetry so important in modern physics, given that
one must eliminate it when interpreting what the theory represents? In this pa-
per we discuss the sense in which gauge symmetry can be fruitfully applied to
constrain the space of possible dynamical models in such a way that forces and
charges are appropriately coupled. We review the most well-known application
of this kind, known as the ‘gauge argument’ or ‘gauge principle’, discuss its diffi-
culties, and then reconstruct the gauge argument as a valid theorem in quantum
theory. We then present what we take to be a better and more general gauge ar-
gument, based on Noether’s second theorem in classical Lagrangian field theory,
and argue that this provides a more appropriate framework for understanding
how gauge symmetry helps to constrain the dynamics of physical theories.
1. Introduction
All interpretations of modern gauge theories adopt two core assumptions at
their foundation. The first is that gauge symmetry arises when there are more vari-
ables in a theory than there are physical degrees of freedom. Hence the well-known
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2 The Gauge Argument: A Noether Reason
soubriquets: gauge is ‘descriptive redundancy’, ‘surplus structure’, and ‘descrip-
tive fluff’. Correspondingly, considerable effort has been devoted to techniques for
eliminating gauge redundancy in order to appropriately interpret gauge theories.1
The second assumption is that a theory with gauge symmetry constitutes the gold
standard of a modern physical theory: witness the gauge symmetries invoked in
the Standard Model. This leads to a remarkable puzzle of gauge symmetry: why is
gauge symmetry so ubiquitous? We do not aspire to give a single, ultimate answer.
The purpose of this paper is to articulate one answer to this question: namely, that
gauge symmetry provides a path to building appropriate dynamical theories — and
that this rationale invokes the theorems of Emmy Noether (1918).
Of course, a number of answers — alternatives to simple eliminativist inter-
pretations of gauge — have already been articulated. For example, gauge theories
provide a convenient calculational technique, as in the use of a potential A in clas-
sical electromagnetism. On the other hand, it would be odd if the “great gauge
revolution” turned out to be, au fond, a matter of calculational convenience; and
indeed there is more to the story. More importantly: in many cases gauge symme-
try cannot be eliminated without also eliminating the possibility of local Lorentz
invariance and Lorentz invariant quantities.
Gauge symmetries can also encode important physical information, in spite
of their being symmetries. The best-known example, which is vivid because of its
experimental significance, is the effect of Aharonov and Bohm (1959), in which non-
local information (of a different kind than due to quantum entanglement) can be
contained in the gauge potential.2 But we will be concerned with the two theorems
of Emmy Noether (1918).3
Noether’s first and better-known theorem (commonly called simply Noether’s
theorem) implies that global (or what we will call rigid) symmetries of a classical
Lagrangian field theory — i.e. symmetries in which the redundancy is specified
1Cf. Earman (2002, 2003, 2004), Healey (2007) and Rosenstock and Weatherall (2016, 2018). To
some extent we agree: see Gomes and Riello (2020a) in response to Dougherty (2020a).
2Other more recent examples include Rovelli (2014, 2020) and Gomes (2019, 2021a,b), who em-
phasise the role of gauge in characterising the coupling of systems and regions, respectively; and
Nguyen et al. (2020), who emphasise its role in defining certain local gauge fields. For a history of
the early debate on the AB Effect see Hiley (2013). Philosophers have recently focused on questions
about the locality and reality of the gauge potential (cf. Healey 1997; Belot 1998; Maudlin 1998;
Healey 1999; Nounou 2003; Mattingly 2006; Healey 2007; Lyre 2009; Belot et al. 2009; Myrvold
2011; Wallace 2014) and Mulder (2021). More recently, Shech (2018) and Earman (2019) have
challenged the idealisations associated with the Aharonov-Bohm effect, and Dougherty (2020b)
has defended them.
3For details on the historical development of Noether’s theorems see Kosmann-Schwarzbach (2011).
For a modern statement of the first and second theorems, cf. Olver (1993), Theorems 5.58 (p. 334)
and 5.66 (p. 343) respectively.
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in exactly the same way at all spacetime points — correspond to charges that are
conserved over time, such as energy and angular momentum. For example, the
conservation of an electron’s charge can be viewed as arising from the (redundant)
global phases of the electron’s wavefunction. But we will be equally concerned with
Noether’s second theorem, which is about local (or what we will call malleable)
gauge symmetries — meaning that the specified redundancy varies between space-
time points. Agreed: this theorem’s physical significance is of course already well
recognized, including in the philosophical literature (Brading and Brown (2000,
2003), Brading (2002)). In particular, a recent line of work shows how such mal-
leable gauge symmetries encode relationships between spatial or spacetime regions,
and thus between parts and wholes in a field theory.4
In this paper, we will urge that these two theorems give us a further answer to
the puzzle, ‘why gauge?’ It is an established, indeed conventional, answer amongst
practising physicists. For it is implicit in the well-known gauge argument or the
gauge principle first formulated by Hermann Weyl (1929).5 This argument begins
with an assumption of local gauge symmetry, and then claims to ‘derive’ the form
of the dynamics of quantum theory in a way that exhibits ‘minimal coupling’ to an
electromagnetic potential. We claim that this is an instance of a much more general
role for gauge, which has not been at all discussed in the philosophical literature:
gauge symmetry supports theory construction, in particular by constraining the
space of models to those in which charges appropriately couple to forces. Although
some philosophers like Brading and Brown (2003) have pointed out the role of gauge
symmetry in theory construction, it is this last coupling of charges to forces that we
would like to highlight, which provides the answer to the puzzle of gauge symmetry
that we will advocate here.
As experts will be quick to note: the gauge argument in its common textbook
form is fraught with difficulties. However, our argument is that these difficulties
can be overcome; and indeed that there is a more general gauge argument available
for use in the construction of physical theories. We thus proceed in Section 2 to
rehearse the usual gauge argument and its woes. In Section 3 we offer a glimmer
of hope, by reconstructing the gauge argument as a theorem of quantum theory,
which we argue vindicates to some extent its use in the formulation of quantum
electrodynamics.
4See Donnelly and Freidel (2016), Gomes (2021a,b) and Gomes and Riello (2020b), in response
to the discussions of ‘direct empirical significance’ in Brading and Brown (2004) and Greaves and
Wallace (2014).
5An English translation and extended commentary is given by O’Raifeartaigh (1997, Chapter 5).
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The real limitation of the textbook gauge argument, as we shall see, is that
it does not reflect the generality of the kind of argument that physicists typically
use. Thus, in Section 4, we present a much more general gauge argument, which we
call the Noether gauge argument, in the context of classical Lagrangian field theory.
The key to understanding this argument is the combined use of both Noether’s
first and second theorem. In the first step, one applies Noether’s first theorem to
establish the conservation of charge. In the second step, one makes use of the power
of Noether’s second theorem, to infer specific interpretive information about how
these charges couple to gauge fields. We draw out and clarify what that information
is, in the presence of various kinds of symmetries that are sometimes referred to as
‘gauge’, in order to illustrate the precise extent to which the gauge argument can
be fruitfully used to constrain physical theories.
2. The gauge argument and its critics
The textbook gauge argument or gauge principle uses gauge invariance to
motivate a quantum theory of electromagnetism. We begin Section 2.1 with a brief
presentation of this argument as it is usually presented. Classic textbook statements
can be found in Schutz (1980, §6.14) Göckeler and Schücker (1989, §4.2), and Ryder
(1996, §3.3), among many other places. Then in Section 2.2 we assess it. The
argument has been discussed in the form below by philosophers as well, such as
Teller (1997, 2000), Brown (1999), Martin (2002), and Wallace (2009, §2). In spite
of the criticisms, we will argue in Section 3 that a grain of truth remains in the
gauge argument.
2.1. Beware: Dubious arguments ahead. We begin by describing a quantum
system with the Hilbert space L2(R3) of wavefunctions, recalling that a unique pure
quantum state is represented not by vector, but by a ‘ray’ of vectors related by a
complex unit. This implies that the transformation ψ(x) 7→ eiθψ(x) for some θ ∈ R,
referred to as a ‘global phase’ transformation, acts identically on rays, and is in this
sense an invariance of the quantum system. But now, the story goes, suppose
we replace this with a ‘local phase’ transformation ψ(x) 7→ eiφ(x)ψ(x), in which
the constant θ is replaced with a function φ : R3 → R, or indeed with a smooth
one-parameter family of such functions φt(x) for each t ∈ R. This transformation
is ‘local’ in the sense that its values vary smoothly across space and time. The
corresponding Hilbert space map Wφ : ψ 7→ eiφψ does not act identically on rays.
However, one might still wish to postulate that this transformation has no ‘physical
effect’ on the system, or is ‘gauge’. Various motivations for this step are given in
The Gauge Argument: A Noether Reason 5
the textbooks, often with vague references to general covariance of the kind found
in general relativity: which we will return to shortly. But to mimic the standard
presentation, we will simply press forward, referring to Wφ : ψ 7→ eiφψ as a local or
malleable gauge transformation.
The main premise of the argument is to assume that the Schrödinger equa-
tion must be invariant under this local phase transformation. But, for the free non-
relativistic Hamiltonian in the Schrödinger (position) representation, this is not the
case.6 Writing ψt(x) := e
−itHψ(x) with H = 1
2m
P 2, one finds that Wφ : ψ 7→ eiφt(x)ψ















(P +∇φt)2 + dφtdt
)
ψt(x).
Instead of preserving the Schrödinger equation, a gauge transformation produces
the additional terms ∇φt and dφtdt in the Hamiltonian.
To correct this situation, the big move of the gauge argument is to introduce
a vector A = (A1, A2, A3) and a scalar V , which are assumed to behave under the
gauge transformation as,
A 7→ A+∇φt, V 7→ V − dφtdt .(2)
This has the form of the familiar gauge freedom of the electromagnetic four-potential
that leaves the electromagnetic field unchanged.
To restore invariance of the Schrödinger equation under gauge transforma-
tions, one thus apparently needs only to assume that the Hamiltonian is not free,






(Pr − Ar)2 + V,
which is known as the minimally coupled Hamiltonian. For, replacing the Hamil-
tonian in the Schrödinger equation with this one, we find that the transformation
rules for A and V perfectly compensate for the extra terms appearing in Equa-
tion (1). Thus, gauge invariance of the Schrödinger equation is obtained, provided
the Hamiltonian contains interaction terms A and V that behave like the 3-vector
potential A and scalar potential V for an electromagnetic field.
6Obvious variations of the argument exist for relativistic wave equations too (cf. Ryder 1996, §3.3).








ψt(x). For the RHS, use the fact that
e−iφt(x)Peiφt(x) = P +∇φt(x) (cf. Footnote 11), and so e−iφt(x)P 2eiφt(x) = (e−iφt(x)Peiφt(x))2 =





both sides on the left by e−iφt(x) and rearranging then gives the result.
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With an eye towards a modern gauge theory formulated as a vector bundle
with a derivative operator, it is even possible to interpret the potentials A and




Aµ = (V,A), one finds that the procedure above is equivalent to replacing ∂µ with,
(4) Dµ := ∂µ + iAµ = (
d
dt
+ iV,∇+ iA) = (Dt, D).
This is commonly referred to as a ‘covariant derivative’. Then, substituting d
dt
7→ Dt





we derive the minimally coupled Hamiltonian of Equation (3). Accordingly, this
choice of Hamiltonian is sometimes advocated, for example by Lyre (2000), on the
basis of a ‘generalised equivalence principle’, according to which electromagnetic
interactions with all matter fields “can be transformed away”.8 In short, it appears
as if minimal electromagnetic coupling has been derived out of nothing: or at least,
from an assumption of gauge invariance.
2.2. Criticisms of the gauge argument. That is how the story is usually pre-
sented. We agree: it is far from water-tight. The argument begins with a system
with a global symmetry, gratuitously generalises it to a local symmetry — which, to
emphasise, was not required for mathematical consistency or for empirical adequacy
— and then, in order to fix the ensuing non-invariance of the governing equations,
proceeds to conjecture a new force of nature. To put it uncharitably: the argument
fixes a problem that didn’t exist by conjecturing a redundant field, and then turns
this game around, claiming to come out successfully by ‘retrodicting’ the existence
of electromagnetism. More charitably: the gauge argument suffers from at least
three categories of concerns. We will set out each of these three concerns here. In
Section 3 we will then offer a glimpse of how the first two can be answered, and in
Section 4 present an alternative Noether gauge argument that answers them entirely.
The first category of concerns is the gauge argument’s claim to have derived
a dynamics that is specifically electromagnetic in nature. Although a formal set of
operators Aµ = (V,A) have been included in the dynamics, no evidence is given that
these operators take the form required for any specific electromagnetic potential, or
that the coupling to Aµ will be proportional to a particle’s charge e, or even that
Aµ is non-zero. And if they could be shown to be non-zero, then as Wallace (2009,
p.210) rightly asks: “how do neutral particles fit into the argument?” A minimally
coupled dynamics does not to apply to neutral particles, and yet since the gauge
8This principle arises in particular on a principal fibre bundle formulation of gauge theory; for
philosophical appraisals, see Lyre (2000), Weatherall (2016, §5), and Healey (2007, Ch. 6.3).
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argument never mentioned or assumed anything about charge, it presumably is
intended to apply to them.
This concern can be assuaged by scaling back the conclusion of the gauge
argument: its aim is not to derive any particular electromagnetic interaction, but
rather to constrain the dynamics so as to be compatible with gauge invariance. This
leaves open the specific character of Aµ, and indeed even the question of whether it
is zero. Although not all authors adopt this attitude towards the gauge argument,
we advocate it as the preferable attitude, and will develop it in more detail in the
subsequent Sections.
A second category of problems arises out of the free-wheeling argumentative
style of the gauge argument. For example, it is not a strict deductive derivation of
either the electromagnetic potential or the dynamics. At best, the gauge argument
appears to show that one can adopt a minimally coupled Hamiltonian in order to
assure gauge invariance. But this does not ensure that one must do so: the door
appears to be left open for other dynamics to be gauge invariant, but without taking
the minimally coupled form that the gauge argument advocates. As Martin (2002,
p.S230) writes: “The most I think we can safely say is that the form of the dynamics
characteristic of successful physical (gauge) theories is suggested through running
the gauge argument.”
Another example of free-wheeling argumentation is in the motivation for
requiring the local gauge transformations Wφ : ψ 7→ eiφψ to be symmetries. Some-
times a preference for this transformation over global phase transformations is du-
biously motivated by a desire to avoid superluminal signalling.9 In other cases it
is motivated by the coordinate invariance of a spatial coordinate system. But as
Wallace (2009, p.210) points out, no reason is given as to why we do not simi-
larly consider local transformations of configuration space, momentum space, or
any other space, to be symmetries. Nor is there any clear reason why the U(1)
symmetry of electromagnetism is chosen as the global symmetry motivating the
move to the local symmetry, as opposed (say) the SU(3) symmetry of the strong
nuclear force.
We will claim that most of these problems can be entirely solved. In the
first place, the gauge argument can in fact be tightened and turned into a valid
9For example, Ryder (1996, p.93) writes: “when we perform a rotation in the internal space of φ
at one point, through an angle Λ, we must perform the same rotation at all other points at the
same time. If we take this physical interpretation seriously, we see that it is impossible to fulfil,
since it contradicts the letter and spirit of relativity, according to which there must be a minimum
time delay equal to the time of light travel.” For a detailed critique, see Martin (2002, p.S227).
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derivation, as we will show in the next Section. Not only is it that one can adopt
the minimally coupled Hamiltonian in the presence of gauge invariance, but one
must do so, when gauge invariance is viewed in terms of a particular constraint on
the ‘velocity observable’, in a sense we will precisely define. We will similarly argue
that the postulate that local gauge transformations are symmetries in a certain
sense — namely, that they are unitary operators — is not really a postulate, but a
formal fact about the framework in which these transformations are presented.
Regarding the generalisation of the gauge argument to other global symme-
try groups beyond electromagnetism, we wholeheartedly agree with Wallace: one
should expect, and indeed we will argue in Section 4, that an appropriate gener-
alisation of the gauge argument can also be applied to these more general gauge
groups.
Our approach here speaks to a third category of concerns, that the gauge
argument is awkwardly placed as an argument for a quantum theory of electro-
magnetism. The construction of a covariant derivative operator suggested by the
gauge argument is most appropriately carried out not in quantum field theory, but
in the classical Yang-Mills theory of principal fibre bundles. Here too we agree with
Wallace:
“In fact, it seems to me that the standard argument feels convincing
only because, when using it, we forget what the wavefunction really
is. It is not a complex classical field on spacetime, yet the standard
argument, in effect, assumes that it is. This in turn suggests that
the true home of the gauge argument is not non-relativistic quantum
mechanics, but classical field theory.” (Wallace 2009, p.211)
Indeed, it is remarkable that in the presentation of the gauge argument above, the
role of the ‘rigid’ or ‘global’ U(1) symmetry is hardly substantial: only the local
malleable symmetries play any substantial role in the argument. This is an oddity
to be sure, though one that we will correct shortly.
In Section 4, we will switch perspectives from the verdammten Quantensprin-
gerei to the context of classical Lagrangian field theory, and propose a framework
that substantially clarifies the roles of rigid gauge symmetries, of malleable gauge
symmetries, and of their relationship, which we will call the ‘Noether gauge argu-
ment’.
But before we develop this argument, we would like to first show how the
first two categories of concern are unwarranted: a more rigorous formulation of
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the textbook gauge argument is possible, which dispels any worries about a free-
wheeling, under-motivated argument. Its only serious shortcoming in this more
rigorous form, as we will see, is its lack of generality. This will be corrected in
Section 4, when we develop an analogous argument in classical field theory. It is
not a straightforward generalisation of Section 3’s theorem, but rather a ‘cousin’ of
it. Namely, the theme of both results is that malleable gauge symmetries are used
to constrain the dynamics.
3. The gauge argument as a theorem
3.1. Gauge transformations and probabilities. Suppose we view the textbook
gauge argument as beginning with a strongly continuous one-parameter unitary
representation t 7→ U(t) = e−itH on the Hilbert space H = L2(R3), but we do not
yet know the form of the Hamiltonian H. Here we will adopt the vector notation
x = (x1, x2, x3), and similarly Q = (Q1, Q2, Q3), with the latter representing the
vector position, where for each i = 1, 2, 3 we have a self-adjoint operator Qi defined
by Qiψ(x) = xiψ(x). The aim of the gauge argument, as we see it, is then to use
gauge symmetry to constrain the possible dynamics that are available.
The first step is to observe a fact in this framework — not an assumption, but
a consequence! Namely: the local gauge transformations are symmetry operators
that transform position and momentum as one would expect a gauge transformation
to do.10 That is: for any smooth function φ : R3 → R, whose gradient ∇φ we can
think of as smoothly deforming space however we wish, there is a Hilbert space
operator that preserves inner products, i.e. a unitary operator, given by:
(5) Wφψ(x) := e
iφ(x)ψ(x)
for all x ∈ R3. A similar fact applies in four-dimensions: defining a one-parameter
set φt(x) of such transformations, there is a ‘malleable symmetry’ or unitary Wφ
defined by,
(6) Wφtψ(x) := e
iφt(x)ψ(x).
for all ψ ∈ H, and for all x ∈ R3 and t ∈ R. These unitaries Wφ transform position
Q = x and momentum P = −i∇ as one would expect a gauge transformation to
10By ‘symmetry’ we mean unitary operators, sometimes referred to as ‘kinematic symmetries’ (cf.
Jauch 1968, Chapter 13). Antiunitary operators are symmetries of time-reversing transformations
(see Roberts 2017, 2021), but will play no role in this discussion.




φ = Q WφPW
∗
φ = P −∇φ.(7)
Some presentations (rather mysteriously) even say that these facts require
a postulate of general relativity; as when Schutz (1980, p.219) writes, “[t]hese turn
out to be the appropriate equations for that system in general relativity” (cf. also
Lyre (2000, p.11)).
We would like to emphasise that, for the purpose of constructing a unitary
operator that implements the transformations in Equation (7), no such arguments
are needed. It is a direct mathematical consequence of the Hilbert space formalism
that each malleable transformation φ gives rise to a unitary Wφ = e
iφ, and that these
unitaries behave like gauge transformations with respect to position and momentum.
A new physical postulate is only required when malleable transformations are used
to constrain the dynamics: which we consider next.
3.2. A rigorous quantum gauge argument. We are now ready to view the
gauge argument as providing a constraint on the possible dynamics for quantum
theory, on the basis of a certain assumption of gauge invariance. The postulate of
gauge invariance that we will state is in the spirit of the textbook gauge argument.
We begin by clarifying exactly what we take this to mean.
As before, we begin with a unitary dynamics t 7→ Ut = e−itH on the Hilbert
spaceH = L2(R3), for which we do not yet know the Hamiltonian H. The 3-velocity
in this context is defined to be the rate of change of the position operator in the
Heisenberg picture with respect to this unitary group. Thus, it is given by,






where Q = (Q1, Q2, Q3) is defined as in the Schrödinger representation by Qrψ(x) =
xrψ(x) for each r = 1, 2, 3, for all wavefunctions ψ in its domain.
Our central postulate for how malleable symmetries constrain the dynamics,
in pictorial terms, is that if a smooth transformation φ : R3 → R is applied, then the
3-velocity should compensate for the extra term ∇φ that arises, as shown in Figure
1. One must remove the contribution of ∇φ from the value of the velocity.12 Thus,
11The first equation follows just from φ being a function of position. The second equation follows








= e−iφ(−i∇ −∇φ)ψ =
W ∗φ (P −∇φ)ψ, for all ψ ∈ L2(R3).
12In Equation (13) of Section 4 we propose a similar postulate to characterise gauge invariance
in the context of classical field theory; where we note that it is also possible to consider the
contribution of higher-order terms, in which case this definition can be viewed as a first-order
approximation.
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if Wφ = e
iφ is the unitary transformation associated with φ, then the assumption
says:
(9) eiφQ̇e−iφ = Q̇−∇φ.
This is close enough to the meaning of a transformation by a smooth function that
it is somewhat surprising that it provides any constraint on the dynamics, let alone
enough to establish minimal coupling.
Figure 1. The constraint of malleable symmetries is that the 3-
velocity Q̇ must transform so as to remove the contribution of the
gradient ∇φ of a smooth function.
Although Equation (9) is thus not a priori, it is natural and rich in conse-
quences. We formalise this in the following.13
Theorem. In the Schrödinger (position) representation on L2(R3) with dynamics





= i[H,Qr]. Suppose that for every smooth
one-parameter set of smooth functions φt : R




where Wφ := e
iφt and ∇ = (∂x, ∂y, ∂z). Then:






(Pr − Ar)2 + V
for some m > 0 and some functions (i.e. operators) Ar(x) and V (x) that depend
only on position, and not on momentum;
(ii) the transformed unitary group t 7→ Ũt := WφUt =: e−itHφ (where the last










13A proof is provided in the Appendix. The ideas of this proof are a turned-around cousin of
Jauch (1964) and Jauch (1968, §13-5), an analysis of which is in Roberts (2012, Appendix A).
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(iii) the Schrödinger equation is ‘gauge invariant’ under Wφ, in that if
i d
dt




In summary: we assume that the 3-velocity transforms in a given manner un-
der smooth transformations of space (WφQ̇W
∗
φ = Q̇−∇φ), and prove a consequence
that the dynamics are constrained to be given by a minimally coupled Hamiltonian:
in which, moreover, the smooth transformations behave like gauge transformations
of the vector and scalar potentials, in that they leave the Schrödinger equation
invariant.
We take this to largely dispel the concerns about the free-wheeling nature
of the textbook gauge argument. Cast in this form, any Hamiltonian that is con-
strained by malleable transformations as in Equation (10) must be minimally cou-
pled; and this leads to gauge invariance as in (ii) and (iii) of the Theorem. Of
course, this still leaves the specific coupling undetermined up to a choice of vec-
tor and scalar potential, including the choice of zero. But this is fully compatible
with our perspective that gauge symmetry can be viewed as providing a powerful
constraint on the dynamics.
There remains the question of how to view this kind of argument in the
context of more general gauge groups. And there remains a question of what role
the rigid gauge transformations play in constraining a theory’s dynamics. Here we
propose a shift to a more natural perspective for dealing with such constraints,
which uses the tools of classical Lagrangian field theory. This is the subject of the
remainder of this paper.
4. A Noether Reason for Gauge
4.1. Overview. For a more general view of how gauge symmetries constrain the
dynamics of a physical theory, we will now, as announced in Section 1, make a two-
step use of the theorems of Emmy Noether (1918): the first, and then the second.
We will refer to this as the Noether gauge argument. Agreed: this is by no means a
new observation, since practising physicists use this property of gauge frequently!14
But we believe it is worth highlighting and clarifying exactly the kind of information
that can be extracted in various cases, as part of our advocacy (cf. Section 1) that
philosophical discussions of gauge should better recognise gauge’s significance for
theory construction.
14A succinct example is Avery and Schwab (2016), who write “Noether’s second theorem, which
constrains the general structure of theories with local symmetry”.
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The Noether gauge argument proceeds in two steps. First, we choose a rigid
gauge symmetry associated with an arbitrary global gauge group, and propose
that its action produces a variational symmetry: by Noether’s first theorem, this
guarantees the presence of a collection of conserved quantities. But matter fields
do not exist in isolation: they couple to other ‘force’ fields, and possibly to long-
range ones. Thus, in the second step, we introduce such a field and apply Noether’s
second theorem, ‘loosening’ the rigid symmetries to malleable ones; and we show
that this provides three concrete constraints on the dynamics, viz. the vanishing of
the three lines in Equation (14) below. This result is limited: we make no claim
that the only way to get these benefits is by malleable symmetries. However, it
remains the best known and most tractable way to achieve them.
The interpretation of these constraints can be seen on a case-by-case, or
sector-by-sector, basis: we consider their implications for rigid versus malleable
symmetries, as well as for A-independent versus A-dependent ones. Thus in the
following Sections we will spell out the consequences of the three constraints for
four different sectors of the theory. In particular, we will find through explicit
computation — adopting only a minor additional assumption of non-derivative
coupling — that when we couple the matter fields to force fields, gauge-invariance
guarantees that the Lagrangian for these fields is massless, and so they constitute
long-range interactions.15 The generalised Gauss laws thus are guaranteed to relate
the content of the matter current within a region to the flux of the other force fields
at distant closed surfaces surrounding such a region.
Disclaimers: first, in the interest of clarity and pedagogy, we will not try to
incorporate the full generality of Noether’s theorems, which is truly extraordinary
but over-complicated for our discussion. In its place we make several simplifying
assumptions, both about the Lagrangian density and about the action of the gauge
group, which are not strictly speaking necessary but which simplify our argument.
Second, throughout this discussion, we will follow standard practice and distinguish
two equivalence relations for classical fields on a manifold. First, we write ‘=’
to denote ordinary equality between fields, irrespective of the satisfaction of the
equations of motion, and refer to this as strong or off-shell equality. Second, given
a fixed Lagrangian, we write ‘≈’ to denote equality between fields that holds if the
15The formalism equally applies to spin-2, or gravitational, fields; but, apart from some cursory
remarks, we will not discuss these.
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Euler-Lagrange equations are satisfied for that Lagrangian, and refer to this as weak
or on-shell equality.16
4.2. Field theory and malleable symmetries. In the textbook gauge argument,
the (rigid) gauge transformations were assumed to be the group of phase transfor-
mations U(1), and the (malleable) gauge group was given by its locally-varying
analogues. We now lift this restriction and allow the global gauge group to be
any compact Lie group G, with Lie algebra g. We can characterize the malleable
(infinitesimal) gauge transformations induced by G (and g), on a local patch U ,
as the smooth functions from U to G (to g, respectively).17 So we can write local
(infinitesimal) gauge transformations as G = C∞(U,G) (or Lie(G) = C∞(U, g), re-
spectively): the group of gauge transformations has a group operation that is just
that of G, pointwise on M , i.e. for g, g′ ∈ G, gg′(x) = g(x)g′(x). The group acts as
the adjoint on the algebra, Ad : G→ GL(g), with (g, ξ) 7→ Adgξ := gξg−1 ∈ g, and
so the action of the algebra on itself is just the Lie algebra commutator, g× g→ g
with (ξ, ξ′) 7→ [ξ, ξ′] ∈ g.
Let ϕ be a map that takes each point of U into V , a vector space of dimension
n which is ϕ’s value space. We will use i to indicate components in V , e.g. ϕi. We
will take ϕ to represent matter fields. Locally, that is, on appropriate trivializing
patches U ⊂ M , ϕ is a V -valued smooth function on U , the class of which is
C∞(U ;V ).18
16This common terminology is due to Dirac (cf. Henneaux and Teitelboim 1994).
17The precise description of gauge transformations requires a brief incursion into the mathematical
theory of fiber bundles. A principal fiber bundle is a smooth manifold P that admits a smooth
and free action of the group G, e.g. G × P → P ; (g, p) 7→ g · p. Spacetime is encoded in the
bundle as the collection of orbits O of the group: π : P → M ' P/G, where π is the smooth
submersion induced by the action of G. One can think of the bundle as attaching an orbit space
isomorphic to G (but without a preferred identity, much like an affine space) to each point of M .
Thus π−1(x) =: Op = {g · p, g ∈ G} ' G for x ∈ M , but there is no canonical isomorphism
between π−1(x) and G (it requires the choice of a point p) and no decomposition P 'M ×G. To
talk about gauge transformations as maps in spacetime, we must restrict their domains to subsets
of spacetime. Locally, i.e. for subsets U ⊂M , we can write π−1(U) ' U ×G, once we have choice
of trivialisation: s : U → P such that π ◦ s = IdU . Here s can be thought of as a submanifold that
intersects all the group orbits in π−1(U) only once. In terms of s we can write the trivialization as
U ×G→ π−1(U); (x, g) 7→ g · s(x). Global gauge transformatios are diffeomorphisms τ ∈ Diff(P )
such that τ(g · p) = g · τ(p). Locally, by equivariance, τ maps orbits to orbits, and so takes one
trivializing section s to another s′; and if τ(s) = τ ′(s) = s′, then τ(p) = τ ′(p) for p ∈ π−1(U).
Therefore, locally, gauge transformations are uniquely encoded by the map from s to s′. It is easy
to characterize these maps: since s provides a local trivialization, we can write, for all x ∈ U ,
s′(x) = g(x) · s(x), for some g ∈ C∞(U ;G). Therefore, locally, gauge transformations are of the
form g ∈ C∞(U ;G). This local construction will be mirrored for vector bundles in footnote 18.
18Here the mathematically precise description of ϕ is as a section of a vector bundle π : E →M ,
which one can think of as having an internal vector space isomorphic to V attached to each point
of M , that is, with π−1(x) ' V for x ∈ M , but without a canonical decomposition E ' M × V .
Locally, i.e. for subsets U ⊂ M we have an isomorphism π−1(U) ' U × V , but the isomorphism
is not canonical: writing a field that is locally valued in V requires a choice of trivialisation, as in
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To represent the forces that are sourced by ϕ, we take the collection of
vector-valued one forms Aaµ, which take a vector of M at a point of U to g, with µ
representing the spacetime components of the vector and a indicating the compo-
nents in g.19 These fields are associated with a dynamics by postulating a preferred
real-valued action functional S(ϕi, A
a
µ), whose extremal values are postulated to
provide the equations of motion.
We also assume G has some action (a representation) on V , the vector space
of local field-values of the matter fields ϕ, defining this action pointwise as g ·ϕ(x) =
g(x) · ϕ(x) ∈ V . Let tija be the n-dimensional Hermitean matrix representation on
V of g, i.e. t : g → GL(V ), where the a are indices of the Lie algebra space,
in the domain of the map, and i, j denote the matrix indices in the image of the
map, acting linearly on V . Then we take the (malleable) gauge transformations,
infinitesimally parametrized by ε ∈ Lie(G), to act on our fundamental variables as:
(13)
δεϕi = εatija ϕj = (εtϕ)iδεAaµ = Dµεa = ∂µεa + [ε, Aµ]a .
where the square brackets are the Lie algebra commutators. Here the ∂µε
a on
the right hand side of the second line echoes the ∇φ of equation (9), and the
second term in that same side allows for a non-Abelian transformation group. These
transformation rules are not as general as they could be, but neither are they
arbitrary: they are the first-order terms of the Lie algebra action on the respective
vector spaces — in particular, ‘first-order’ in the derivatives of ε and in powers of A
and ϕ — and in this sense provide an appropriate approximation of any malleable
gauge transformation. We here focus on this special case, equation 13, only to
simplify the presentation of our argument.
Our aim now is to constrain how the matter fields ϕ couple to force fields. Let
L(ϕ, ∂ϕ,A, ∂A) be the Lagrangian defining our action S(ϕ,A), which we assume
for simplicity does not depend on higher-order derivatives.20 Variation along the
footnote 17 above (the standard example here is vector fields on M : we can only write them as
maps U → Rn if we fix a basis for the tangent spaces). Thus ϕ is a section of E, i.e. ϕ : M → E
such that π ◦ ϕ = IdM , but locally, given a trivialization we can write it as function ϕ : U → V .
The trivialization of the vector bundle can be ‘soldered onto’ the trivialization of the principal
bundle, mentioned in footnote 17, by thinking of E as an ‘associated vector bundle’. The simplest
way to think of this association is to see the elements p ∈ P of the bundle as linear frames for V
(at x ∈ π(p)). This soldering guarantees that a gauge transformation on P will also act on the
matter fields in the appropriate manner, e.g. (13).
19What is a ‘force’ and what is ‘matter’ will be further distinguished by their transformation
properties under a gauge transformation, in (13). Matter transforms linearly, whereas forces
acquire derivatives of the generator as inhomogeneous terms.
20This can be justified by appeal to Ostrogradsky’s theorem; see Swanson (2019) for a philosophical
discussion.
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Since the derivatives of ε are functionally independent, this equation implies that
each line must vanish separately : the first line is a consequence of rigid symmetries,
and the remaining two are of malleable ones. These are the fundamental constraints
on the dynamics that we propose to analyse, and the task of the remainder of this
paper will be to unpack them.
The requirement that each of these lines vanishes provides a strong constraint
on the form of the Lagrangian, and hence on the dynamics. This, we claim, provides
the core of the Noether gauge argument. To extract interesting physical information
from this constraint, there are four sectors to compare, arising from the use of
either rigid or malleable symmetries, and either A-independent or A-dependent
Lagrangians. We treat each sector in turn.
The results will be: a theory with rigid symmetries can be dynamically non-
trivial and complete—i.e. it will not require further constraints—when A does not
figure in the Lagrangian. With malleable symmetries and no A-dependence, the
constraints demand that the dynamics be trivial, i.e. no kinetic term for the matter
field can appear in the Lagrangian. When forces have their own dynamics, that
is, when the Lagrangian is A-dependent, a theory with rigid symmetries may be
incomplete, and require further constraints to render the dynamics of A compatible
with charge conservation; an example will be given. It is only in the last case,
where we have malleable symmetries and A-dependence, that the equations of mo-
tion coupling forces to charges is automatically consistent with the conservation of
charges (and so no further constraints are required). Thus we will see the power of
malleable symmetries and A-dependence together to secure an interacting dynamics
that conserves charge. And this will be our Noether gauge argument.
4.3. A-independent, rigid symmetries. First, suppose we are as in the first step
of the textbook gauge argument: there is no A in sight, and the symmetry is rigid,
so that ∂µε
a = 0 = ∂µ∂νε
a. Then the vanishing of the first line of Equation (14)





















where we again are using ‘≈’ to denote ‘on-shell’ equality. Applying this to Equation











In summary, we have derived what is guaranteed by Noether’s first theorem, that the
current Jaµ(ϕ) is conserved on-shell. Or, turning this around: symmetry requires the
Lagrangian to be restricted so that Jaµ(ϕ) defined in Equation (18) is divergenceless.
Having constrained the space of theories in this manner, there are no more equations
to satisfy: conservation of charge is consistent with the dynamics and no further
constraints need to be imposed.
4.4. A-independent, malleable symmetries. In the next case, suppose that we
allow —in addition to Section 4.3’s equations — the ones arising from a ∂ε 6= 0,
while still not allowing for an A in the theory. We get, in addition to equations (18)







So here the conserved currents are forced to vanish. Clearly this condition is guar-
anteed for all field values if δL
δ∂µϕi
= 0, which requires a vanishing kinetic term. A
careful analysis of more general cases reveals this is the only generic solution.21
21For instance, assume δLδ∂µϕi depends only on ∂µϕi, then since t
a
ijϕ
i can take any value, we must
have δLδ∂µϕi = 0. Now, suppose
δL
δ∂µϕi
depends on ϕi as well. Since ϕi has no spacetime indices to
match the µ of the gradient ∂µϕi, to make a Lagrangian scalar, we would need the ϕi contribution
to this term to itself be a scalar, call it F (ϕ). So for example: δLδ∂µϕi = ∂µϕi(ϕjϕ
j), or more
generally δLδ∂µϕi = F
′(∂ϕ)iµF (ϕ) (where we raise indices with an inner product of V ); and as in
the example F (ϕ) = ϕjϕ
j = 0 iff ϕ = 0. But then the same argument as before suffices, since
we can still allow taijϕ
i to take any value in V (for an appropriate, non-zero value of the scalar
formed just from ϕ, e.g. the contraction ϕjϕ
j). Or, in other words, for ϕ 6= 0, δLδ∂µϕi (t
aϕ)i = 0
iff F−1(ϕ) δLδ∂µϕi (t
aϕ)i = 0 where F
−1(ϕ) δLδ∂µϕi depends only on ∂µϕ; and thus we are back to the
first, simple case.
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This analysis pinpoints the obstacle appearing in the textbook gauge argu-
ment that we rehearsed in Section 2.1. When the matter field Lagrangian has a
non-trivial kinetic term, malleable transformations cannot be variational symme-
tries. That is: if we impose malleable symmetries without introducing a gauge
potential, we cannot consistently also allow a term in the Lagrangian including
∂µϕi. It is to allow such terms and still retain the malleable symmetries that the
next two Sections will introduce the gauge potential.
4.5. A-dependent, rigid symmetries. We first proceed precisely as in the first
case, introducing the A field, but still keeping the symmetries rigid. Using the
equations of motion for A as well as those of ϕ, i.e. E[A] = 0 as well as E[ϕ] = 0, we











= ∂µ(Jaµ(ϕ) + J̃
a
µ(A)) ≈ 0
and nothing more; there are no further conditions that the terms of the Lagrangian
need to obey. (Here, the definition of J̃aµ(A)) is given by (20).)
So, unlike the previous case, which admitted only a trivial kinetic term for
the matter field ϕ, this sector will admit many possible dynamics. The problem here
is of a different nature: the theories are not sufficiently constrained; the equations
of motion do not automatically guarantee conservation of charges.
Let us look at an example of how things can go wrong in this intermediate
sector containing forces but only rigid symmetries, for the simple, Abelian theory.
In the Abelian theory, J̃(A) ≡ 0, since quantities trivially commute. Thus Equa-
tion (20) only contains the standard conservation of the matter charges and the
symmetries are silent about the relationship between this charge and the dynamics
of the forces.
Consider a kinetic term of the form ∂(µAν)∂
(µAν) where round brackets de-
note symmetrization. So this differs from the standard Maxwell theory kinetic term
for the gauge potential: namely, FµνF
µν := ∂[µAν]∂
[µAν] where square brackets
denote anti -symmetrization. But the symmetrized version is nonetheless gauge-
invariant (under rigid transformations). Now, the Euler-Lagrange equations for
this theory differ only very slightly from the Maxwell-Klein-Gordon equations. The
equations of motion for A yield:
(21) ∂µ(∂(µAν)) = Jν









]a ≈ [∂µ δLδ∂νAµ , Aν ]a + [ δLδ∂νAµ , ∂µAν]a = ∂µ[ δLδ∂νAµ , Aν ]a.
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in contrast with the usual ∂µ(∂[µAν]) = Jν . But clearly, unlike the usual case, the
divergence of the left hand side does not automatically vanish:




At this point, we would have to go back to the drawing board and introduce more
constraints on the theory: this theory does not couple forces to charges in a manner
that guarantees charge conservation.
Thus we glimpse our overall thesis: only by introducing malleable gauge
symmetries do we restrict interactions between forces and their sources so that
they are consistent with the conservation of the matter current.
Of course, in this example it is easy to see what is the smoking gun: the
kinetic term ∂(µAν)∂
(µAν) is not invariant under malleable transformations. Ac-
cording to the next Section—our fourth sector—requiring this stronger form of
invariance will restrict us to the space of consistent interactions. No tweaking re-
quired.
4.6. A-dependent, malleable symmetries. In this fourth sector, we again ob-
tain (20), from the vanishing of the first line of (14), since nothing changes at that










a = Jaµ(ϕ) + J̃
a
µ(A).
Once again using the Euler-Lagrange equations for A, to substitute the left-hand










=: kaµν , we now obtain:
(25) Jaµ(ϕ) + J̃
a
µ(A) = −∂µkaµν + E(A)aµ ≈ −∂µkaµν
This equation links both the matter and force currents to the dynamics of the force
field.
We already know from the vanishing in the first line of Equation (14) that
the sum of the currents is divergence-free on shell (cf. Equation 20). Thus, taking
the divergence on the left hand side of (25), we must have ∂ν∂µkaµν = 0. Since two
derivatives of a scalar field are necessarily symmetric, all we need in order to satisfy
conservation is that:
(26) kaµν = −kaνµ or kaµν = ka[νµ],
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which is just what we have from the vanishing of the third line of Equation (14).
Thus, the result of including malleable symmetries, in this simple case, restricts us to
consider Lagrangians in which the derivatives of Aaµ only enter in anti-symmetrized
form: ∂[µA
a
ν]. This restriction excludes the previous example of equation (21).
More generally, if we try to find a Lagrangian that includes force fields with-
out obeying the relations obtained from the malleable symmetries, the equations
of motion of the force fields and those relating force fields and matter may require
further constraints to be compatible with charge conservation, as we saw in the
counter-example in the previous section. This is the power of local gauge symme-
tries: they link charge conservation — taken as empirical fact or on a priori grounds
— with the form of the Lagrangian for the force fields.
4.7. Masslessness: An invitation. There is yet more information that can be
gleaned from the Noether gauge argument, which is contained in equation (25):
upon integration, it yields a boundary term and a volume integral. That is, it
gives a relation between a quantity at a far-away boundary — related to the flux
of the force field components Aaµ — and the matter content inside this region. In
the Abelian case, for the 0th component of the equations of motion, this just gives
the standard Gauss law. But more generally, being detectable at arbitrarily long
distances makes the ‘forces’ associated to kµν long-range.
23
It is common to conclude24 on this basis that gauge invariance forbids the
presence of a mass term for Aµ. However, like the textbook gauge argument, the
general form of this argument for masslessness is often heuristic in character. In
particular, it assumes that each term in the Lagrangian is independently gauge-
invariant. Then it is true that, on its face, a term like m2AaµA
µ
a is not invariant
under malleable symmetries.25
To show in full generality that masslessness is required would go beyond
the scope of this paper: we leave it as an exercise to the ambitious reader to
explore! However, we can still improve on the standard heuristic argument without
much effort in a special case that includes electromagnetism, by enforcing Equation
23This is a classical treatment. Quantum mechanically, non-Abelian theories would suffer from
confinement, which lies outside the scope of this discussion.
24For example, in the context of quantum electrodynamics, compare (Weinberg 1995, p. 343).
25Note that the Proca action does include a mass term for the photon field, i.e. the gauge potential
A, but it is only gauge-invariant with m = 0, in which case it just reduces to the standard Maxwell
equations. For m 6= 0, one must have, in relation to the Maxwell equations, gauge-breaking, or
‘gauge-fixing’, conditions. For a discussion, see Itzykson and Zuber (1980, §3-2-3).
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(14) off-shell, for all models (ϕ,A), and requiring that any mass term m be field-




A term in the Lagrangian of the form m2AaµA
µ
a would not leave any trace in
the first line of Equation (14). But from the second line, again assuming no on-shell
constraint between values of the matter and force field, from the second term, we






Call this term κµν(A, ∂A), which is such that [κµν , A
µ]a ∝ Aaν for all A. Take, in this




ν , so that A = Ã := σ1⊗dy, where y is a spacetime
coordinate function and σ1 is one element of the Lie-algebra basis. This implies that
the partial derivatives inside κµν(∂A,A) vanish, that is, κµν(∂Ã, Ã) = κµν(Ã), and
therefore that it is a polynomial of A with no derivatives, i.e. it is a polynomial
that contains a single element of the Lie-algebra basis, σ1, and the spacetime 1-form
basis, dy. But this means that the commutator [κµν , Ã
µ]a vanishes, and therefore
cannot be proportional to Ã. As a result, in order to maintain off-shell invariance
under malleable transformations, a mass term for A cannot be included in the
Lagrangian.
5. Conclusion
We have given a detailed defence of the use of gauge symmetries for theory-
building, in the spirit of the textbook gauge argument.
We first showed how the textbook gauge argument can be tightened into a
rigorous theorem in quantum mechanics, which begins with the assumption that
malleable transformations ‘appropriately’ transform velocity, and concludes that
the dynamics must be given by the minimally coupled Hamiltonian (Section 3 and
the Appendix).
We then went on to defend a much more general ‘Noether gauge argument’
in classical field theory. In particular, gauge symmetries of various kinds were fed
into the powerful theorems of Emmy Noether, in order to produce precise con-
straints on the possible dynamics. The result is more than a simple argument that
gauge symmetry is useful for theory construction: gauge symmetry constrains how
one can consistently combine charges with the fields they interact with. Noether’s
first theorem of course implies charge conservation; but the second theorem then
implies relations between the theory’s equations of motion, which amounts to a
coupling constraint. In other words, converting a rigid symmetry into a malleable
one enforces the compatibility between charge conservation and the dynamics of the
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corresponding fields: a result which has not yet been stressed by the philosophical
literature.
Of course, one may still feel that gauge redundancies are like Wittgenstein’s
ladder: once our theories have been successfully constructed, why not throw gauge
symmetries away, and move down to a description in which such redundancies have
been eliminated? We would reply: on the contrary, the ladder remains invaluable
in the interpretation of gauge theories. In addition to the several reasons for gauge
identified in the Introduction to this paper, we find that gauge symmetries provide
an explanatory reason — a reason drawing heavily on Noether’s two theorems —
for the way charges couples to fields.
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Appendix
Theorem. In the Schrödinger (position) representation on L2(R3) with dynamics





= i[H,Qr]. Suppose that for every smooth
one-parameter set of smooth functions φt : R




where Wφ := e
iφt and ∇ = (∂x, ∂y, ∂z). Then:






(Pr − Ar)2 + V
for some m > 0 and some functions (i.e. operators) Ar(x) and V (x) that depend
only on position, and not on momentum;
(ii) the transformed unitary group t 7→ Ũt := WφUt =: e−itHφ (where the last














(iii) the Schrödinger equation is ‘gauge invariant’ under Wφ, in that if
i d
dt
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Proof. We first note that if Wφ := e
iφ := eiφ(Q), then
WφQW
∗
φ = Q, WφPW
∗
φ = P −∇φ.(27)









= e−iφ(−i∇ − ∇φ)ψ = W ∗φ(P − ∇φ)ψ, for all ψ ∈
L2(R3). From the second equation, and our assumption that WφQ̇W
∗
φ = Q̇ −∇φ,
it follows that [Wφ,mQ̇ − P ] = 0 for any m 6= 0. Since this holds in particular
when φ(x) = ax for all a ∈ R, it follows that mQ̇ − P commutes with Q (Blank
et al. 2008, Proposition 5.9.3). But the position operator Q = x in the Schrödinger
representation has a simple spectrum (Blank et al. 2008, Example 5.8.2), which is
to say that its commutant {Q}′ is equal to its bicommutant {Q}′′. (This is the
continuous spectrum analogue for Q of all of a quantity’s eigenvalues being non-
degenerate.) By von Neumann’s bicommutant theorem (Blank et al. 2008, Theorem
5.5.6) this implies that there is a function Ar (for each r = 1, 2, 3) of position alone
such that,
(28) Ar(x) = Pr −mQ̇r.
Using the fact that A depends only on position and thus commutes with Q,
we can now observe by direct calculation that for each r = 1, 2, 3:
[(P − A)2, Q] = [P 2, Q]︸ ︷︷ ︸
−2iP
−[PA,Q]− [AP,Q] + [A2, Q]︸ ︷︷ ︸
0





= −2iP − ([P,Q]︸ ︷︷ ︸
−i
A) + A [P,Q]︸ ︷︷ ︸
−i
)
= −2i(P − A),
(29)
and thus i[ 1
2m




where the second equality applies Equation (28), so [H− 1
2m
(Pr−Ar)2, Qr] = 0. By
the simple spectrum property it again follows that there is a function V of position





(Pr − Ar)2 = V , which establishes Equation (11).
To confirm Equation (12), let ψ(t) := Ũtψ := WφUt =: e
−itHφψ for each
ψ ∈ L2(R). Then on the one hand we have that,
(30) d
dt
ψ(t) = −iHφe−itHφψ = −iHφψ(t).
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Equations (30) and (31) together imply Hφ = WφHW
∗
φ− ddtφ. Moreover, since Wφ is
a function ofQ and so commutes with functions ofQ, it follows thatWφ(P−A)W ∗φ =
P −∇φ−A = P − (A+∇φ). Therefore, using Equation (11) and rearranging, we
find that










(Pr − (Ar +∇φ))2 + (V − dφdt ) ;
which proves Equation (12) and claim (ii).
The final claim (iii) is now verified by confirming that if i d
dt
ψ = Hψ and
ψφ := Wφψ, then we have that i
d
dt
ψφ ≡ i ddt(Wφψ) = Wφ(−
dφ
dt
ψ + i d
dt








)Wφψ = Hφψφ. 
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